Horizon to evaluate the developments in the Middle East, a new definition beyond the classical geographical one is necessary. Because the perceptions of regional and global actors regarding strategic interests and threats encompass a wider area, ranging from Asia to the African continent, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean.
In this context, it is sometimes necessary to define overlapping or operational conflict areas among these power-focused actors. For an objective observation, if we need to make a weighted distinction based on countries:
- a) Global Powers
- b) Regional Powers
- c) Proxies associated with these powers
- d) Independent non-state conjunctural hybrid formations
In the field, we observe two global superpowers, the United States and the Russian Federation. In addition to this, occasionally, at low levels and in limited areas, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy can also be observed. Emerging as a political/military interventionist actor, it is observed to participate in specific coalitions. (For example, in Libya, Lebanon, the Gulf of Aden, the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. The presence of two military bases defined as ‘sovereign territory’ by the United Kingdom in Cyprus should not be overlooked).
In the broad geographical scope we are focusing on, five regional powers, two of which are Arab, are actively demonstrating military and/or political power. Egypt and Saudi Arabia serve as Arab regional powers, while non-Arab regional powers include Turkey, Israel, and Iran. The common characteristic among these regional powers is their potential capability for robust armed intervention in various dimensions. However, it is noteworthy that Egypt and Saudi Arabia strive not to be seen as taking sides in an actual conflict with Israel. Other than being a regional power, Turkey also has institutional ties with the West. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) possess experienced, well-trained, strong, and well-equipped military forces for cross-border and offshore operations. However, Turkey faces a serious, multi-faceted asymmetric threat.
The perception of Turkey is affected by several factors. The first of these is Iraq. For Turkey, Iraq is a gateway to the Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, and West Africa via the shortest route. This is very important in terms of uninterrupted and cost-effective supply chains and commercial relations with pipelines and other logistical opportunities. Secondly, the terrorist threat originating from Northern Iraq, posed by the PKK and ISIS, has necessitated precautionary measures for national security. Consequently, Turkey finds itself in a position where it must take various military actions beyond its borders. Lastly, an important issue is ensuring the security and maintaining the highest possible status of Iraqi Turks, who are erroneously labeled as “Turkmens,” in Iraq.
However, as a result of the first and second Gulf Wars, which were instruments of Washington’s policy to divide and weaken Iraq for specific reasons, the Saddam regime was overthrown. The de-Baathification process led to the dismantling of the state and the army, and with a so-called federal constitution, the de facto Kurdish formation in the north gained a legal status within Iraq. (Taking advantage of the weakened central government, the separatist PKK organization has also become a serious security issue along the southeastern border).
In Syria, instability began with the initiative of the United States’ Greater Middle East project in 2011 which led to the uprising predominantly initiated by the Muslim Brotherhood, resulting in civil war. External military interventions (Iran, Turkey, Russia, US) as well as the emergence of radical groups or opposition forces, acting as proxies, led to a hybrid internal conflict. Iran supported Assad during this turmoil. While also backing the Assad regime, in Lebanon, Iran strongly supported the Hezbollah movement. (It is considered that Lebanon deserves special attention as a unique case). Turkey, in the meantime, supported and continues to back opposition forces and movements against Assad through various means.
The majority of Syrian refugees, in addition to Lebanon, predominantly come to Turkey as “irregular migrants”, and a portion of them passing through Turkey to Europe has added another international dimension to the issue. The ongoing conflict in Syria has transformed into a vital matter of national security and a social issue for Turkey in relative terms.
In the field, Turkey’s prioritization based on its perception of asymmetric threats can be outlined as follows: Firstly, priority is given to border security to prevent unauthorized crossings and terrorist infiltrations. Ensuring that armed groups and communities supported or under the protection of Turkey in Syria are not attacked by the Syrian government forces or government backed militias. Within this framework, Turkey controls an area of 8835 km2 in Syria. Turkey attaches special importance to preventing the merger of the two cantons under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), described as affiliated with the terrorist organization PKK/YPG/PYD. The secular nature of the SDF, its alignment with the United States in the fight against ISIS, and its significant contributions have led to overt support from Washington. Additionally, due to its dialogue with the Syrian regime and limited political cooperation, the SDF is not perceived as problematic or objectionable by Russia and Iran.
Another interesting point regarding Syria is that the United States, Russia, and Iran appear to share a common understanding with each other of the prevailing issue areas. The first of these areas is to prevent Turkey from expanding further into the regions of Syria under its control, while the second is to maintain the status of the Syrian airspace as a “no-fly zone” for Turkey. The basic objective of the Sochi and Moscow agreements between Turkey and Russia, as well as the “Astana Process” in which Iran is also involved, is to prevent Turkey from gaining “de facto” control over the territory in Syria.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy to consider preventing its expansion. Indeed, Turkey’s desire to establish a “safe zone” in northern Syria has not materialized. Since 2022, except for the Idlib region where radical forces prevail, there has been a relatively stable period in Syria. It is stated that certain institutions of Turkey have been in contact with the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR).
On the other hand, with Bashar al-Assad’s regime is readmitted to the Arab League. It is known that its bilateral relations with other Arab countries have improved, and high-level contacts have begun. Russia, on the other hand, by prioritizing the return to the stability in Eastern Mediterranean through its traditional and multifaceted relations with the SAR, has largely turned its attention back to the Region. Initially, by primarily utilizing air power, Russia prevented the spread of opposition and externally supported forces, supported Syrian regime forces to advance, and ensured their recapture of strategic points such as Aleppo and the M-5 highway.
On the other hand, Russia has established various observation posts and patrol areas in the area, as well as deployed at the Khmeimim Airbase in Latakia and the naval base in Tartus. As a result of Russia’s intervention, the portion of Syrian territory under the control of the SAR has increased from 17% to 63.38%, including the entire coastline.
Before delving into other Arab countries, it is essential to briefly examine the position of Egypt, a significant Arab regional power. While it is a North African country, its influence extends throughout the Arab world. (Its prestigious status stems from its cultural richness, its leadership position in the non-aligned movement, its pioneering role in Arab political movements, its resilience against radical formations, and its example in the modernization of the Arab world. Its relative military strength, economic structure, strategic position towards Africa, ownership of the Suez Canal, being a regional ally of the US, and its relations with Israel have contributed to this.) In fact, it could be claimed that without Egypt, no dispute in the Arab world could be resolved.
Looking at North African Arab countries, they are collectively are known as the “Maghreb Arab.” Within the societal layers, there are Berber and Tuareg communities present. Although their cultures are primarily of Arab origin, French and Italian influences still hold significant sway. In the Maghreb region, comprised of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania, perhaps with the exception of Tunisia, there are serious border disputes among them. In other words, their inability to reconcile with each other is their common characteristic. Undoubtedly, the most significant of these is the border disagreement stem from Western Sahara between Morocco and Algeria. Consequently, diplomatic relations between the two countries have been severed, and border crossings have been closed. The Maghreb countries have unique social and cultural relationships that extend to Southern European countries such as France, Italy, and Spain, which have persisted to the present day. This has led to a separate threat perception arising from illegal human trafficking originating from these connections.
From an economic standpoint, the abundant and high-quality crude oil and natural gas reserves in Libya and Algeria are of significant importance due to their uninterrupted supply chain. Through both pipelines and tankers, these products can reach European markets quickly and at low costs. For Turkey, Libya holds particular importance in this region. Apart from the existing unstable environment in the country, Turkey attributes special significance to Libya due to a) historical/nostalgic ties, b) diversified trade relations, c) energy security, d) skilled and unskilled Turkish migrant labor force, and e) military cooperation. The Arab Spring uprisings, following Tunisia and hitting Libya in February 2011, quickly escalated into a civil war with the contribution of radical forces, culminating in the bloody end of the Gaddafi regime in August 2011 with NATO military intervention.
The National Unity Government formed under the leadership of Fayez al-Sarraj, backed by the Muslim Brotherhood, originating from Tunisia, has gained international recognition due to its dominance in Tripoli and the state system there. The Libyan National Army, led by General Haftar, which controls the majority of the country and significant portions of the oil fields, and its political supporter, the Tobruk-based House of Representatives group, have centered their power in Benghazi.
Despite various international mediation efforts and national-level elections, the two externally supported groups have failed to reach a consensus. As a result, the country remains divided into two, or even three, parts, including the Fezzan (formerly known as Fizan) region in the south. General Haftar’s faction, supported by France, Egypt, the UAE, and the Russian Wagner Group, controls the capital group supported by Turkey, Italy, Qatar, and Sudan. Turkey’s signing of a maritime jurisdiction agreement with the Tripoli government on November 28, 2019, was met with reactions from Greece and Egypt.
In January 2020, Turkey and Libya signed a military cooperation and security agreement, and Turkey established a military presence at Al Watiya Airbase in northwest Tripoli. In response, General Haftar deployed UAE air forces to Al Qadim Airbase. Recently, the Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s official visit to Tripoli via Malta, along with the announcement of the imminent resumption of Turkish Airlines flights and the soon-to-be-opened consulate in Benghazi, indicates an intriguing development. Turkey’s engagement with General Haftar and the possibility of reaching a common course of action suggest a potential for reconciliation. However, the establishment of a permanent political sphere of influence and the formation of a genuine and stable governing authority in Libya are ultimately dependent on reconciliation with the tribes.
Looking at other Arab countries, the situation may not be significantly different. Sudan is a case in point. The internal conflict between two military factions has sparked a bloody civil war among Muslim Sudanese of the same sect and ethnic background, leading to extensive internal and external displacement. However, the global public and international media’s attention to the conflict in Gaza does not extend to the suffering of the Sudanese population, marked by poverty, disease, and hunger. This neglect applies equally to Darfur.
Yemeni people, suffering from acute diseases and hunger, face a similar plight of neglect from the Arab world. This indifference is also evident in the case of Somalia. It is possible that due to the relatively weak military capabilities of these countries, they have failed to capture attention in the media and public discourse.
The Gulf region, known as the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf, is a geopolitical hotspot where Iran and Saudi Arabia, as regional powers, vie for influence, affecting the balance in the region. Recently, Iran and Saudi Arabia setting aside their bilateral issues under the mediation of Muscat, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states resolving their disputes with Qatar, are not entirely surprising. It can be argued that this “modus vivendi” process is an outcome designed by the US and its like-minded allies. Consequently, despite the sanctions imposed on Iran, the smooth and regular shipment of crude oil to the Indian subcontinent and the Far East continues. If this reconciliation, which occurred before the Gaza crisis, results in a direct or “proximity” method of continued dialogue between the US and Iran following the US presidential elections, it wouldn’t be surprising to see the lifting of sanctions on Iran. However, it should not be overlooked that there is significant resistance to this ad hoc “detente” modality both in the US and Iran.
An interesting point to note is the controlled and measured response shown by Tehran in the Gaza-Israel conflict, parallel to the actions of its proxy, Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran’s relatively restrained reaction is perceived in the West as “significant but measured.” However, developments within Iran itself, including the oversight of the executive branch by the National Assembly, pragmatic and realpolitik-driven foreign policy practices, and its relations with the US, should be examined separately and in depth.
During this period, significant changes are also observed in Gulf countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia. These countries are beginning to shape the infrastructure for creating a wealthy society that can contribute directly to non-oil economic activities in the coming century. Kuwait is demonstrating a relatively participatory legislative system, while in Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince MbS Al Saud has initiated social, economic, and legal reforms to create a new order.This initiative is also supported by the President of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, and the Prime Minister of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Mahkum. In summary, the common goal is to ensure active participation of all people, including women, in the economic and social life.
The Palestine Issue and the Hamas-Israel Conflict
It is stated that we are facing four dangerous crises with global ramifications today. One of them, which also has a passive dimension, occurs in the South China Sea, while the others take place in Ukraine and the Middle East. The first one is characterized by the chronic crisis of the Palestine issue, which has a current extension manifested by the ongoing warfare in Gaza.
The other one is the tension spreading to the Aden Gulf as a derivative of the Hamas-Israel conflict in Gaza. Here, the global supply chain is negatively affected by interventions in maritime traffic both from land and sea by the Yemeni Houthis, with coalition forces’ interventions, including bombardments, proving ineffective for various reasons.
Israel’s ongoing military operation in Gaza, met with global condemnation, has effectively turned into a genocide. However, the chronic Palestinian-Israeli issue, which unites Arab states, has gained a divisive nature within the Arab world in recent years.
Starting with Hamas’ attack, which is the dominant force in Gaza, on October 6, 2023, Israel’s unlimited response has acquired global implications, even influencing U.S. internal politics. Hamas’ attack on Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip is likely seen as a response to the Abraham Accords, even as a reaction to the Arab world’s positive approach to these agreements.
However, when looked at from the Israeli side, the situation appears differently. Indeed, the internal political criticisms against the Netanyahu administration, which have been fluctuating, are now being effectively countered. Furthermore, regarding the resolution of the situation in Gaza, the mediation efforts supported by the United States involving Qatar and Egypt are currently at a standstill. Meeting the maximalist demands of the parties under the current conditions seems impossible.
Indeed, Israel insists that its actions will continue until Hamas ceases its activities and until a final military victory is achieved. On the other hand, Hamas’s political leadership continues to advocate for demands such as a permanent ceasefire and the unconditional delivery of umanitarian aid to the region.It is believed that under current conditions, a solution with two separate states, with undefined internal borders and constitutional statutes, cannot be realized.
[1] Speech given at the in-house workshop with a group of academicians that was organized by the Global Affairs Forum on February 11, 2024 in Istanbul.
[2] Ambassador Selim KARAOSMANOĞLU, Senior Partner at Sitrep Advisors Inc. in İstanbul (www.sitrepadvisors.com) is graduate of Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences, joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in 1970; served as Deputy Chief of Mission at Turkish missions in The Netherlands, Japan; Charge d`Affaires in Libya and in Vatican; as Ambassador in Baghdad, Abu Dhabi and Tehran. Also served at the CSCE Minsk Group as the Turk member of the Group and as the head of Turkish observation team in Kosova.
In the MOFA, he was the Chief of Section and then Head of military affairs at NATO department, Deputy Director General in charge of the Caucasus and DDG for the Balkans. He participated as speaker at Chatham House, Wilton Park Conferences, Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow RF, CSIS Washington, D.C., USA.
Retired from MOFA in 2011, currently engaged in agro-business also participating in international panels and conferences relating to topics on regional security and foreign policy issues.