Nebil İLSEVEN, PhD
SITREP Advisors Inc.-Istanbul/TÜRKİYE
presented at
The 18th Annual Forum of
the World Association for Political Economy
WAPE
Yeditepe University
İstanbul, Türkiye,
August 6-8, 2025.
QUEST FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN AN ERA OF WANING MULTIPOLARITY: The Case for Conductive Multilateralism*
Nebil İLSEVEN, PhD
SITREP Advisors Inc.-Istanbul/TÜRKİYE
Abstract
Contemporary international order is marked by an apparent contradiction: the proliferation of global challenges that require robust multilateral responses, and a simultaneous crisis of multilateralism rooted in institutional fatigue. This fatigue—manifested in declining legitimacy, operational gridlock, and eroding political will—has become a defining feature of global governance. In parallel, the multi-polar configuration of the post-Cold War world is under strain, with rising tensions among major powers, growing fragmentation, and increasing unilateralism. The two trends are mutually reinforcing: as the multi-polar order weakens, international institutions suffer; and as institutions decay, multi-polar cooperation becomes more difficult to sustain.
The paper observes that by strengthening and fostering multilateralism in critical areas and engaging the public more effectively in addressing global challenges that affect directly their very own existence, welfare and destiny, policymakers can achieve a more stable and inclusive global system. To achieve this goal, however, international community must put forth the will and effort to build a revised version of multilateralism that would accommodate the harsh winds of change on one hand and ensure progress towards a more humane and just social order for all, on the other. It is further suggested that a new world order that is built upon “conductive multilateralism” would facilitate dynamic models of collaborative and participatory institutional networks, organized around “geographic plane(s) of common issues” as opposed to “issues of given geographic plane(s).”
* This paper has been prepared as a Conference Paper and presented at the 18th Annual Forum of the World Association for Political Economy, titled, Multipolarity in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities in Political Economy at Yeditepe University in İstanbul, Türkiye, held on August 6-8, 2025.
- I) Introduction
At present, the international political environment is undergoing a state of profound flux, marked by transformations across political, economic, demographic, and cultural domains in ways that are historically unprecedented. This pervasive atmosphere of change extends across the globe, encompassing individuals, societies, nations, and states alike, leaving no region untouched and no actor unaffected. The very fabric of human interaction—ranging from interpersonal relationships to the operations of international institutions—is being reshaped, with significant implications for both the structural foundations and the substantive dimensions of global affairs.
Change, of course, is not a new phenomenon; it has been constant throughout human history. It is not the existence of change itself that characterizes the current moment as exceptional, but rather the nature of its manifestation today. What distinguishes contemporary change from its historical antecedents is its triadic character: the unprecedented velocity at which it unfolds, the magnitude of its reach, and the force with which it imposes transformation. Frequently abrupt and far-reaching, such change often surpasses foresight, overwhelms the present order, and disrupts even the most resilient institutional structures. As ever, its nature remains profoundly tectonic—fundamental, deep-seated, and transformative.
This paper recognizes that international relations are described in static models; models that are articulated in the language of “polarity,” as uni-polar, bi-polar or multi-polar, depending on the number of global powers who prevail as dominant players in world politics in a given period in history. It is argued here that while studying international relations, the terminology of polarity provides a certain level of presentation convenience but runs the risk of falling substantially short of understanding world affairs for developing proper academic insights or for relevant policy proposal or, for that matter, mandating effective and meaningful policy actions. The transactional nature of relations in a world that is described by various forms of polarity is important but not sufficient to develop a broad and forward-looking appreciation of international affairs unless the “play field” is described and studied in terms of “flows” in global affairs.
As such, this paper argues that following a sound understanding of multipolarity and the concept of power relations that underlie international relations, it is important to study multipolarity in terms of multipolarization, as an on-going process. Furthermore, it is argued that any effort to build a more just and equitable world must focus on developing innovative institutional structures that capture a) the flows in international relations on one hand while, on the other, b) ensuring to operate on confidence-projection and self-motivating premises for a world in the form of a home for all.
In studying the current power relations in the international system, the paper challenges simplistic assumptions that we are entering a new multipolar world. It is argued that while multiple centers of power exist, there is no cohesive leadership bloc capable of stewarding a global order. This differs markedly from the bipolar stability of the post-Cold War period and the unipolar dominance that followed the end of the Cold War era.
In response, the paper advances the idea of Conductive Multilateralism: a flexible, functional model of global governance. Rather than rely on formal consensus or universal norms, Conductive Multilateralism emphasizes issue-based cooperation, pragmatic coalitions, and timely action. It prioritizes local sensitivities while maintaining global relevance, offering a governance structure that is both adaptive and durable. The paper suggests “conductive multilateralism” as a rather futuristic example for alternative structures to be considered that would lead to a sustainable and resilient world order.
- II) Main Drivers of Change in International Affairs
Climate change and technological advancement stand out as the most influential drivers of this contemporary shift. Their implications are not peripheral but structural, necessitating a reassessment of the very frameworks through which global politics are theorized and practiced. These phenomena are not only reshaping global governance and economic structures but also redefining the parameters of security, development, and societal organization in the 21st century.
Climate change poses significant challenges to state stability, human mobility, and global health. As environmental degradation accelerates, it exacerbates underlying vulnerabilities, fuels conflict over scarce resources, and compels a re-evaluation of traditional notions of sovereignty, responsibility, and global justice. Its impacts transcend the traditional boundaries of state-centric international relations, affecting not only environmental systems but also security, economy, migration, and diplomacy. From rising sea levels to increased frequency of extreme weather events, climate change undermines territorial integrity and worsens resource scarcity, triggering conflicts and humanitarian crises.[1] Scholars and governments increasingly acknowledge the link between environmental degradation and global instability.[2] Yet, without systemic mitigation strategies, climate-induced disruptions continue to intensify existing inequalities and stress fragile political systems.[3] Climate change exposes the limitations of existing international institutions and consistently highlights the need for coordinated inter-generational and transnational governance solutions.[4]
Technological advancements, on the other hand, and the exponential growth of technological innovation are rapidly altering the Dynamics of power, communication, and production.[5] The proliferation of digital technologies, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and cyber capabilities is transforming economies, labor markets, and the very architecture of international relations. Technology not only accelerates the pace of change but also introduces complex ethical, legal, and security dilemmas that global institutions are often ill-equipped to address. Moreover, technological asymmetries are contributing to new forms of inequality and geopolitical competition, challenging established hierarchies and alliances.
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, biotechnology, and digital platforms are restructuring economies, altering labor markets, and redefining political influence. These technologies do not merely provide tools of efficiency but mechanisms of power consolidation, surveillance, and social engineering.[6] The unregulated development and deployment of technology is already paving the way to disinformation campaigns, autonomous weapons systems as the geopolitical consequences of technological advancement often outpace regulatory efforts, leaving global institutions struggling to keep up.[7]
Together, these two forces intersect in powerful and unpredictable ways, generating both opportunities and profound uncertainties. They necessitate a reconceptualization of governance frameworks, a redefinition of global priorities in navigating the rapidly evolving international landscape. As Anne-Marie Slaughter notes, power in the digital age becomes increasingly networked, rather than hierarchical, requiring new strategies for influence and governance.[8]
III) International Order: Conceptual Definition
States constitute the primary units of analysis in the study of international relations. In broader terms, they are independent political communities, each endowed with a governing authority and exercising sovereignty over a defined territory and population segment.[9] These communities assert internal sovereignty—the supreme authority within their territorial boundaries—and external sovereignty, which denotes independence from other external actors rather than dominance over them.[10] A political unit that merely claims sovereignty, but lacks the capacity to enforce or exercise it, does not fulfill the criteria of statehood in the strict sense.[11]
An international system, or system of states, is established when two or more states engage in sustained interactions that are significant enough to influence each other’s decision-making processes, leading them to behave—at least to some extent—as components of a broader whole.[12] This system is characterized by regular and observable contact among states, wherein each state’s conduct becomes a variable in the strategic calculations of the others.[13]
State interactions within such a system can be direct—through geographic proximity, rivalry, or alliance—or indirect, shaped by third-party relationships or the general systemic influence exerted by each state.[14] These interactions may involve cooperation, conflict, neutrality, or even mutual disregard, yet still contribute to the dynamics of the system.[15] Moreover, interactions can occur across various spheres—political, strategic, economic, or social—and may range from comprehensive to limited in scope. The interactions may be present over a whole range of activities- political, strategic, economic, social- as they are today, or only in one or two; it may be enough, as Raymond Aron’s definition of an international system implies, that the independent political communities in question “maintain regular relations with each other.” and are all capable of being implicated in a generalized war.[16]
- IV) International System: Structural Outlook
Building on this conceptualization, Martin Wight introduces a typological distinction between an “international states system” and a “suzerain-state system.”[17] In an international states system, the component units are sovereign states, each recognized as having ultimate authority within its own borders and independence from external control. Sovereignty here is both a legal status and a practical condition. By contrast, a suzerain-state system is one in which a single dominant state exercises overarching authority or supremacy over others—sometimes through formal imperial rule, other times through deeply asymmetrical dependencies. The Roman Empire’s relations with its neighboring territories serve as a historical exemplary of such a system.[18]
Wight further observes that hegemony the predominance of one state over others—may exist within either type of system, but the difference lies in its durability and contestability. In a suzerain-state system, hegemonic power is permanent and structurally embedded, rendering challenges to its authority impractical or illegitimate. In contrast, within an international states system, hegemony is temporary, often contested, and liable to shift over time due to changes in power distribution or legitimacy claims.[19] Thus, even in periods marked by a dominant power (such as the post-World War II American-led liberal order), the system remains international so long as sovereignty retains normative and operational relevance for all participating states. This distinction is analytically significant for understanding historical and contemporary configurations of international order. It allows scholars to differentiate between hierarchical and anarchic systems, and to assess the conditions under which state sovereignty is either preserved, diluted, or overridden by supranational or imperial authority.
Beyond the structural analysis of international systems, another critical conceptual framework in the study of international relations is that of the “international society,” or “society of states.” This concept refers to a group of states that, recognizing shared interests and values, consider themselves bound by a common set of rules governing their interactions and participate in shared institutions[20]. The existence of an international society implies more than mere interaction; it involves a mutual recognition of legitimacy, responsibility, and normative obligations.
If modern states are considered part of an international society, it is because they adhere to normative principles in their conduct, such as respect for each other’s sovereignty, the sanctity of treaties, and limitations on the use of force[21]. These norms are operationalized through institutional mechanisms, including international law, diplomatic practice, multilateral organizations, and even customary procedures relating to armed conflict.
Importantly, the concept of international society builds upon the notion of an international system but is not reducible to it. While an international system arises whenever states interact and influence each other’s strategic calculations, an international society requires an additional layer of normative and institutional cohesion[22]. States may be embedded in a system of interaction without perceiving themselves as part of a shared normative order.
Historical examples illustrate this distinction. Prior to the nineteenth century, several non-European states—including the Ottoman Empire, China, Japan, Korea, and Siam—were integrated into the European-dominated international system through war, diplomacy, and commerce, yet were excluded from the European society of states. Their participation in international politics was functional but not normative: they were active actors but not recognized as legitimate members of a shared moral or legal community.
The Ottoman Empire, for instance, engaged in wars, alliances, and diplomacy with European powers from the sixteenth century onward, functioning as part of the international system. However, for many centuries, both the Ottomans and the European powers denied the existence of common interests, refused to consider treaties as morally or legally binding, and adhered to separate institutional structures. It was not until the Treaty of Paris in 1856, concluding the Crimean War, that the Ottoman Empire was formally recognized as a member of European international society.[23] Arguably, full recognition within this normative order was not achieved until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 which confirmed Turkish sovereignty under the new Turkish Republic.[24] This historical evolution underscores the distinction between systemic participation and societal inclusion in international relations. The society of states is thus not merely a descriptive feature of global politics but a normative structure with specific conditions for membership, shaped by evolving standards of legitimacy, reciprocity, and institutional engagement.
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